Monday, December 7, 2009

Daily Comment - 7th December 2009: The Debt Economy

Macro

Let’s get off to an easy start this Monday.

Firstly, to summarize Friday in the US – it was all about the jobs numbers. Nonfarm Payrolls came in much better than expected at -11k (vs -125k expected). This meant US unemployment actually improved from 10.2% to 10%. Pretty surprising number for everyone, I think – even the bulls!

Now on my weekend reading I stumbled across this rather contrarian article in ZeroHedge: Albert Edwards on a potential Yuan Devaluation. That’s right… not an appreciation revaluation of the Yuan, but a devaluation! Read on, this is an interesting piece if only because it helps to see a new perspective on the value of the Yuan.

Finally, in a NY Times piece, James Surowiecki talks about The Debt Economy. He takes a different tack to me, implying that it was political legislation and attitudes towards subtle tweaks on taxation policies which have helped to gently coax a culture of debt (as opposed to inflation mismanagement). The truth is it’s probably a bit of both.

There are a couple of peculiar things about these tax breaks—which have been around as long as the federal income tax. The first is that they’re unnecessary. Few people, after all, can save enough to buy a home with cash, so home buyers naturally gravitate toward mortgages. And businesses like debt because it offers them tremendous leverage, making it possible to put down a little money and potentially reap a huge gain. Even in the absence of the deductions, then, there would be plenty of borrowing. The second thing about these breaks is that their social benefits are pretty much nonexistent. Advocates of the mortgage-interest deduction, for instance, claim that it increases homeownership rates. But it doesn’t: in countries where mortgage deductions have been eliminated, homeownership rates haven’t dropped. Instead, the deduction simply inflates house prices. The business-interest deduction, meanwhile, may lower an individual company’s taxes, but it also means that the over-all corporate tax rate is higher, so its real impact is to give companies with lots of debt an unjustified advantage.

If the benefits are illusory, the costs are all too real. Economies work best, generally speaking, when people are making decisions based on economic fundamentals, not on tax considerations. So, as much as possible, the tax system should be neutral between debt and equity, and between housing and other investments. It’s not, and, worse still, as we’ve seen in the past couple of years, debt magnifies risk: if companies or individuals rely on large amounts of leverage, it’s much easier for bad decisions to lead to insolvency, with significant ripple effects in the wider economy. A debt-ridden economy is inherently more fragile and more volatile. This doesn’t mean that the tax system caused the financial crisis; after all, the tax breaks have been around for a long time, and the crisis is new. But, as a recent I.M.F. study found, tax distortions likely made the total amount of debt that people and companies took on much bigger. And that made the bursting of the housing bubble especially damaging. So encouraging people to take on debt qualifies as a genuinely bad idea.

It reminds us that debt is like speed when driving a car. It simply magnifies risk in both directions – to the upside and the downside. Also, while reading this article I thought about the so-called Wealth Effect. The effect of rising asset prices and how this “perceived” increase in wealth, in turn, influences consumer confidence and thus the modern economy as a whole, in a sort of backward loop of causality. The Wealth Effect, of course, is a symptom of a debt-dependent society, debt magnifies the effect of asset price inflation and deflation (and thus the aversion to deflation and thus the importance of pursuing accommodative policy at the Fed – which causes yet more debt). Thus in a society less pre-occupied with debt, the inflation of an asset, say, the price of one’s house, is barely influential on consumption patterns. However, where that house has been financed with huge amounts of debt, from a macroeconomic perspective, the perceived return (and loss) on capital is outsized. The psychological effect is magnified, hence the Wealth Effect.

Macro Data to Watch:

  • Taiwan CPI and export numbers

Markets

The S&P got off to a flier due to the jobs numbers, although there was a bit of a sell off in the middle of the day.

You see Gold? What a sell off. But we had a sell-off like this at the end of the week before and the precious metal still hit a new high the following week. Let’s see if the same thing happens this week.

Of course, the Dollar rallied hard on Friday. I’ve been a little wary of being short the Dollar lately. As I’ve said before: too many people on one side of a trade is always recipe for some pain down the road! 

Global Stocks to Watch:

  • Obviously the gold stocks names like Goldcorp, Harmony Gold and Barrick Gold (one of the biggest movers on Friday – down 9%).
  • Banks again – it’s not always about the price. Have a look at my chart of the day for Bank of America. Forget the price, look at the graph below for volume!

[Via http://theinternationalperspective.wordpress.com]

Friday, December 4, 2009

California auditor says CSU wrong to pay official's $152,441 expense

California State University reimbursed a high-ranking official in the chancellor’s office $152,441 for expenses he should not have billed to the university, according to a report released Thursday by the state auditor.

Between July 2005 and July 2008, the official billed CSU for expensive hotel stays, travel around the world, meals that cost nearly $167 a head, phone and Internet service at home, and more than $43,000 for commuting between his home in Northern California and his job at the chancellor’s office in Long Beach, according to the audit.

The audit by Elaine Howle does not name the CSU official. It says he worked in the information technology services department and left the university in July 2008.

A spokeswoman for CSU said the subject of the audit is David J. Ernst, who earned an annual salary of $204,420 when he left Cal State. Ernst now works for the University of California as the chief information officer, drawing an annual salary of $238,000.

Howle called attention to Ernst’s frequent global travel, including trips to Amsterdam, Singapore, London and Melbourne, Australia.

“We found the official took trips that did not appear to have a clear or demonstrable benefit to the state or university. In addition, there was no need for the official to regularly attend nonuniversity events, particularly given the costs involved,” she wrote.

Even his domestic travels were unusually costly, the audit says. Ernst billed the university for a $672-a-night hotel stay to attend a two-day meeting at a resort in Pebble Beach. The airfare for that trip was $662, the audit says.

In another instance described in the audit, Ernst billed the university for four nights at a hotel in San Francisco – at $450 a night – when records show he only stayed there for three.

The university did not exercise enough oversight, Howle claims, and violated its own policies in approving the reimbursements.

“The official consistently failed to follow university policies in submitting requests for reimbursement. In addition, the official’s supervisor and the university failed to adequately review the official’s expense reimbursement claims and follow long-established policies and procedures designed to ensure accuracy and adequate control of expenses,” the audit says.

The CSU chancellor’s office agreed with most of the auditor’s findings and recommendations, the report says. The university agreed it should try to get Ernst to pay back some of the money and scrutinize its reimbursement procedures. But the university did not agree with the auditor that much of Ernst’s travel was unnecessary.

“The university asserted that many of the trips were necessary to maintain a relationship with a particular vendor in whose software the university had made a substantial investment,” the audit says. “Nonetheless, the university still failed to clearly identify how the official’s extensive travel provided it concrete and measurable benefits.”

The CSU faculty union blasted the administration for its lax oversight during a fiscal crisis. Because of state budget cuts, professors are taking furloughs, students are paying higher fees and courses are being cut.

“This improper use of public funds could not have come at a worse time for students and faculty at the CSU,” Lillian Taiz, president of the California Faculty Association, said in a statement. “The $152,441 wasted by this individual should have gone to pay for class sections. This behavior would be inappropriate even in better times, but under the current economic circumstances it is beyond reprehensible.”

Sen. Leland Yee (D-San Francisco), a frequent critic of university management, called on Ernst to pay CSU $152,441 for the expenses the auditor found were improperly billed. He also asked CSU Chancellor Charles Reed and UC President Mark Yudof to publicly report all payments made to executives.

“The public deserves to know the extent of this problem,” Yee said in a statement. “Considering the culture of secrecy and corruption within the UC and CSU administration, it is highly unlikely this is an isolated incident.”

The audit is at: bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/I2007-1158.pdf

[Via http://straightarrow.wordpress.com]

Countercyclical Prices, Price Discrimination, and Black Friday

What follows is probably more of a discussion on price discrimination and countercyclical prices than almost anyone is interested in, so I’m putting most below the fold.

Arnold Kling weighs in again on price discrimination, clarifying his theory of Black Friday discounts and explaining how it can apply to Cyber Monday discounts as well. Arnold has previously responded to my theory of price discrimination by arguing that “the key issue here is that the cost of many products is dominated by overhead costs, and marginal costs are close to zero”, and so a wedge between mc and p may be a necessary and welfare improving. He also argues that because marginal costs do not decline in my cost based theory of black friday, it’s not a traditional microeconomic story.

My cost-based explanation for black friday discounting would be consistent with a simple rule-of-thumb pricing, but I agree with him that that is not a traditional microeconomic story. In the age of Wal-Mart I don’t find simple rule-of-thumb pricing to be a satisfactory theory of firm pricing.

However, another way that an economies of scale model could generate lower prices is if the number of competitors changes in high demand periods. While actual entry and exit is obviously unlikely, there may be effective entry and exit into new product markets by firms on Black Friday due to the exogeneously high demand. According to Warner and Barksy (more on this paper later), “there may be economies of scale or scope of the retailer…Large orders may receive quantity discounts from the manufacturer, or at least have lower per-unit shipping costs. There is an important overhead component to the employment of salespeople…[E]ntry and exit from niches in product space does appear to be a reasonable response to changes in temporary profit opportunities. In this manner, prices may be driven down in period when average selling cost is low.” I do agree with Arnold, however, that this is not a fully satisfactory theory for Black Friday.

Arnold’s theory of Black Friday price discrimination, and of retail sales in general, is that stores offer random discounts to attract price sensitive customers who are willing to wait, while regularly charging a higher price on every other day to customers who are not willing to wait. Some stores end up having random sales on the same day, e.g. Black Friday, as a competitive equilibrium in this model. In addition, Black Friday may have arisen as one of these equilibria because the crowds serve as an additional mechanism to keep price-insensitive shoppers, i.e. the regular shoppers, away.

Arnold’s theory seems like a decent enough explanation to me, it’s probably better than the simple cost-based explanation I offered, and it is a standard price discrimination story going back to, I believe, Hal Varian. However, a better explanation for Black Friday discounts can be found in the literature on countercyclical prices, which is when, counter to textbook economic theory, prices decrease during periods of higher demand.

In this paper, Chevalier, Kayshap, and Rossi (CKR) argue that there are three leading models that can explain the phenomenon: a model of cyclical elasticity of demand, a model of counter-cyclical collusion, and a model of advertising by multi-product firms.

Arnold’s theory is most similar to the cyclical elasticity of demand model, in that it relies on heterogeneous demand elasticities. This model is different from Arnold’s model, however, because it doesn’t assume two kinds of shoppers, and the Black Friday sale date is not an equilibrium result of random discounts. Rather, discounts are offered on Black Friday because of exogeneously high demand, and not vice-versa. This cyclical elasticity of demand model is elaborated on in a paper on holiday and weekend discounts by Warner and Barksy. They explain the large sales on Black Friday as one case of a general model that also explains the fact that prices of consumer goods fall as the week goes on in the Pre-Christmas season. The weekday discount can be in figure X below, which they estimated from a dataset of retail prices.

In fact, as seen in figure 12, part of the Black Friday discounts, which they call the “Thanksgiving Effect”, is explained by a normal Pre-Christmas season friday sales effect.

This type of price discrimination discounting is clearly different then the random sales price discrimination offered by Arnold. The discounts are very non-random, and are determined by days of the week and exogenous increases in demand caused by holidays.

CKR offers two more models of holiday discounts. The second model of price discrimination, the tacit collusion model, argues that the price dispersion is caused by collusion between retailers, and the fact that returns cheating on the collusive agreement are greater in high demand periods.

The third model focuses on strategic advertising and imperfect information. In this model consumers don’t know what prices are until they arrive at the store, at which point consumers’ travel costs are sunk, and so firms can charge a higher than marginal cost price. Firms advertise low prices on, and discount, higher demand items. The implication of this model is that at high demand times retailers will discount the highest demand goods. This model is part of a broad class of loss-leader models, which include equilibria with firms advertising on a subset of items; a much more realistic result.

CKR uses an impressive dataset of grocery store retail prices and wholesale prices to empirically test the three competing models of countercyclical prices during peak demand periods, including Christmas and Thanksgiving. What they find is that people are in fact not more price sensitive during times of high demand, like Black Friday, which contradicts the heterogeneous demand based models, like Arnolds, and supports the loss-leader based model.

Overall, I’m having a hard time pinning Black Friday on a single theory, despite the empirical evidence in favor of the loss-leader model put forth by CKR, and the evidence from Warner and Barsky that Black Friday is part of a general non-random pattern of weekend and holiday discounts. This is because there are features of the random sales model put forth by Arnold that explain aspects of Black Friday that the other theories do not; namely the seemingly purposeful secrecy of some sale items. On Black Friday information about what will be on sale and where is often not publicly announced, and can only be found by searching the web for leaked info. This is inconsistent with the advertising version of the loss-leader model of CKR, and consistent with the random sale theory put forth by Arnold.

In the end, Black Friday discounts may be the result of multiple mechanisms acting in tandem, with several theories capturing part of the truth. However, the best empirical evidence I have seen provides evidence against the heterogeneous demand models, including the one Arnold presents.

My cost-based explanation for black friday discounting would be consistent with a simple rule-of-thumb pricing, but I agree with him that that is not a traditional microeconomic story. In the age of Wal-Mart I don’t find simple rule-of-thumb pricing to be a satisfactory theory of firm pricing.

However, another way that an economies of scale model could generate lower prices is if the number of competitors changes in high demand periods. While actual entry and exit is obviously unlikely, there may be effective entry and exit into new product markets by firms on Black Friday due to the exogeneously high demand. According to Warner and Barksy (more on this paper later), “there may be economies of scale or scope of the retailer…Large orders may receive quantity discounts from the manufacturer, or at least have lower per-unit shipping costs. There is an important overhead component to the employment of salespeople…[E]ntry and exit from niches in product space does appear to be a reasonable response to changes in temporary profit opportunities. In this manner, prices may be driven down in period when average selling cost is low.” I do agree with Arnold, however, that this is not a fully satisfactory theory for Black Friday.

Arnold’s theory of Black Friday price discrimination, and of retail sales in general, is that stores offer random discounts to attract price sensitive customers who are willing to wait, while regularly charging a higher price on every other day to customers who are not willing to wait. Some stores end up having random sales on the same day, e.g. Black Friday, as a competitive equilibrium in this model. In addition, Black Friday may have arisen as one of these equilibria because the crowds serve as an additional mechanism to keep price-insensitive shoppers, i.e. the regular shoppers, away.

Arnold’s theory seems like a decent enough explanation to me, it’s probably better than the simple cost-based explanation I offered, and it is a standard price discrimination story going back to, I believe, Hal Varian. However, a better explanation for Black Friday discounts can be found in the literature on countercyclical prices, which is when, counter to textbook economic theory, prices decrease during periods of higher demand.

In this paper, Chevalier, Kayshap, and Rossi (CKR) argue that there are three leading models that can explain the phenomenon: a model of cyclical elasticity of demand, a model of counter-cyclical collusion, and a model of advertising by multi-product firms.

Arnold’s theory is most similar to the cyclical elasticity of demand model, in that it relies on heterogeneous demand elasticities. This model is different from Arnold’s model, however, because it doesn’t assume two kinds of shoppers, and the Black Friday sale date is not an equilibrium result of random discounts. Rather, discounts are offered on Black Friday because of exogeneously high demand, and not vice-versa. This cyclical elasticity of demand model is elaborated on in a paper on holiday and weekend discounts by Warner and Barksy. They explain the large sales on Black Friday as one case of a general model that also explains the fact that prices of consumer goods fall as the week goes on in the Pre-Christmas season. The weekday discount can be in figure X below, which they estimated from a dataset of retail prices.

In fact, as seen in figure 12, part of the Black Friday discounts, which they call the “Thanksgiving Effect”, is explained by a normal Pre-Christmas season friday sales effect.

This type of price discrimination discounting is clearly different then the random sales price discrimination offered by Arnold. The discounts are very non-random, and are determined by days of the week and exogenous increases in demand caused by holidays.

CKR offers two more models of holiday discounts. The second model of price discrimination, the tacit collusion model, argues that the price dispersion is caused by collusion between retailers, and the fact that returns cheating on the collusive agreement are greater in high demand periods.

The third model focuses on strategic advertising and imperfect information. In this model consumers don’t know what prices are until they arrive at the store, at which point consumers’ travel costs are sunk, and so firms can charge a higher than marginal cost price. Firms advertise low prices on, and discount, higher demand items. The implication of this model is that at high demand times retailers will discount the highest demand goods. This model is part of a broad class of loss-leader models, which include equilibria with firms advertising on a subset of items; a much more realistic result.

CKR uses an impressive dataset of grocery store retail prices and wholesale prices to empirically test the three competing models of countercyclical prices during peak demand periods, including Christmas and Thanksgiving. What they find is that people are in fact not more price sensitive during times of high demand, like Black Friday, which contradicts the heterogeneous demand based models, like Arnolds, and supports the loss-leader based model.

Overall, I’m having a hard time pinning Black Friday on a single theory, despite the empirical evidence in favor of the loss-leader model put forth by CKR, and the evidence from Warner and Barsky that Black Friday is part of a general non-random pattern of weekend and holiday discounts. This is because there are features of the random sales model put forth by Arnold that explain aspects of Black Friday that the other theories do not; namely the seemingly purposeful secrecy of some sale items. On Black Friday information about what will be on sale and where is often not publicly announced, and can only be found by searching the web for leaked info. This is inconsistent with the advertising version of the loss-leader model of CKR, and consistent with the random sale theory put forth by Arnold.

In the end, Black Friday discounts may be the result of multiple mechanisms acting in tandem, with several theories capturing part of the truth. However, the best empirical evidence I have seen provides evidence against the heterogeneous demand models, including the one Arnold presents.

My cost-based explanation for black friday discounting would be consistent with a simple rule-of-thumb pricing, but I agree with him that that is not a traditional microeconomic story. In the age of Wal-Mart I don’t find simple rule-of-thumb pricing to be a satisfactory theory of firm pricing.

However, another way that an economies of scale model could generate lower prices is if the number of competitors changes in high demand periods. While actual entry and exit is obviously unlikely, there may be effective entry and exit into new product markets by firms on Black Friday due to the exogeneously high demand. According to Warner and Barksy (more on this paper later), “there may be economies of scale or scope of the retailer…Large orders may receive quantity discounts from the manufacturer, or at least have lower per-unit shipping costs. There is an important overhead component to the employment of salespeople…[E]ntry and exit from niches in product space does appear to be a reasonable response to changes in temporary profit opportunities. In this manner, prices may be driven down in period when average selling cost is low.” I do agree with Arnold, however, that this is not a fully satisfactory theory for Black Friday.

Arnold’s theory of Black Friday price discrimination, and of retail sales in general, is that stores offer random discounts to attract price sensitive customers who are willing to wait, while regularly charging a higher price on every other day to customers who are not willing to wait. Some stores end up having random sales on the same day, e.g. Black Friday, as a competitive equilibrium in this model. In addition, Black Friday may have arisen as one of these equilibria because the crowds serve as an additional mechanism to keep price-insensitive shoppers, i.e. the regular shoppers, away.

Arnold’s theory seems like a decent enough explanation to me, it’s probably better than the simple cost-based explanation I offered, and it is a standard price discrimination story going back to, I believe, Hal Varian. However, a better explanation for Black Friday discounts can be found in the literature on countercyclical prices, which is when, counter to textbook economic theory, prices decrease during periods of higher demand.

In this paper, Chevalier, Kayshap, and Rossi (CKR) argue that there are three leading models that can explain the phenomenon: a model of cyclical elasticity of demand, a model of counter-cyclical collusion, and a model of advertising by multi-product firms.

Arnold’s theory is most similar to the cyclical elasticity of demand model, in that it relies on heterogeneous demand elasticities. This model is different from Arnold’s model, however, because it doesn’t assume two kinds of shoppers, and the Black Friday sale date is not an equilibrium result of random discounts. Rather, discounts are offered on Black Friday because of exogeneously high demand, and not vice-versa. This cyclical elasticity of demand model is elaborated on in a paper on holiday and weekend discounts by Warner and Barksy. They explain the large sales on Black Friday as one case of a general model that also explains the fact that prices of consumer goods fall as the week goes on in the Pre-Christmas season. The weekday discount can be in figure X below, which they estimated from a dataset of retail prices.

In fact, as seen in figure 12, part of the Black Friday discounts, which they call the “Thanksgiving Effect”, is explained by a normal Pre-Christmas season friday sales effect.

This type of price discrimination discounting is clearly different then the random sales price discrimination offered by Arnold. The discounts are very non-random, and are determined by days of the week and exogenous increases in demand caused by holidays.

CKR offers two more models of holiday discounts. The second model of price discrimination, the tacit collusion model, argues that the price dispersion is caused by collusion between retailers, and the fact that returns cheating on the collusive agreement are greater in high demand periods.

The third model focuses on strategic advertising and imperfect information. In this model consumers don’t know what prices are until they arrive at the store, at which point consumers’ travel costs are sunk, and so firms can charge a higher than marginal cost price. Firms advertise low prices on, and discount, higher demand items. The implication of this model is that at high demand times retailers will discount the highest demand goods. This model is part of a broad class of loss-leader models, which include equilibria with firms advertising on a subset of items; a much more realistic result.

CKR uses an impressive dataset of grocery store retail prices and wholesale prices to empirically test the three competing models of countercyclical prices during peak demand periods, including Christmas and Thanksgiving. What they find is that people are in fact not more price sensitive during times of high demand, like Black Friday, which contradicts the heterogeneous demand based models, like Arnolds, and supports the loss-leader based model.

Overall, I’m having a hard time pinning Black Friday on a single theory, despite the empirical evidence in favor of the loss-leader model put forth by CKR, and the evidence from Warner and Barsky that Black Friday is part of a general non-random pattern of weekend and holiday discounts. This is because there are features of the random sales model put forth by Arnold that explain aspects of Black Friday that the other theories do not; namely the seemingly purposeful secrecy of some sale items. On Black Friday information about what will be on sale and where is often not publicly announced, and can only be found by searching the web for leaked info. This is inconsistent with the advertising version of the loss-leader model of CKR, and consistent with the random sale theory put forth by Arnold.

In the end, Black Friday discounts may be the result of multiple mechanisms acting in tandem, with several theories capturing part of the truth. However, the best empirical evidence I have seen provides evidence against the heterogeneous demand models, including the one Arnold presents.

[Via http://modeledbehavior.com]

POTUS Jobs Conference

The President’s Job Conference at the White House today was just another pathetic joke.  BHO is following in the footsteps of Hoover and FDR at making an economic bubble into a disaster.  Socialism never works.  The laws of economics are like the laws of physics. 

When governments raise taxes, they kill capital.  Destroying capital kills jobs. 

When governments spend money they kill capital.  They take in a dollar and put out less than 28 cents in goods and services.  Destroying that capital – by taking capital out of circulation – kills jobs.

When governments spend much more money than they take in, they create inflation.  Inflation weakens the value of the dollar.  A weak dollar increases the costs of foreign goods – especially oil.  When the price of oil increases, then lower income workers lose their discretionary income.  That shift of capital from domestic purchases to overseas oil producers kills jobs.

Governments create jobs by cutting taxes and cutting spending.    And improving - which includes reducing – regulations, oversight and interventions in the market.

Not rocket surgery.  Even for ‘moe-rahns’  in power skilled, only, in the art and science of politics.

[Via http://jatticus.wordpress.com]

Wednesday, December 2, 2009

The Rationing We Now Have: Swine Flu Vaccine at Wal-Mart

One of the major fallacies in the health care debate is that reform will somehow lead to rationing. As every reasonable analyst has already noted (e.g., in this post by Echnidne), we already have rationing. Right now, those who can pay get care. Those who can’t, don’t. The market determines distribution of resources, but it does so in fundamentally unfair and irrational ways. In other words, the market rations health care.

Here’s the latest example. In Columbus, Ohio, Wal-Mart is offering vaccinations against the swine flu. Wal-Mart called itself a clinic, requested vaccine from the state, and got it.

The result? People who live in Columbus and happen to hear the news first will get vaccinated before people who are at high risk due to asthma, pregnancy, diabetes, emphysema, and so on. This is so obviously unfair that it almost doesn’t bear mentioning. And yet, it obviously needs to be mentioned loudly and repeatedly, because market mechanisms are the worst way to allocate scarce health care resources – especially when it comes to infectious diseases that can harm the public health and not just individuals.

[Via http://kittywampus.wordpress.com]

The Cancer Lounge

The cancer patient racked them up and broke. Clackety-clack. Seven ball in the corner pocket. Five ball in the side.

Skip to next paragraph Enlarge This Image Katie Orlinsky for The New York Times

Joseph Marcianti knew when to fold ‘em; he was with his father, Joe Marcianti, and a friend, John Wiencek.

Light was seeping out of day. The long, brick-walled room was getting busy . People hooked to IVs in whispered conversation. Others working a jigsaw puzzle. Playing gin rummy. All of them caught in an unwelcome dance with mortality.

This is what passes for pleasure in a cancer hospital.

Paul Gugliotta always sought out the pool table. His game had sharpened beyond expectations. Since a diagnosis of lymphoma in June, Mr. Gugliotta, a chemical engineer from Long Island, had had two lengthy stays at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center on the Upper East Side. He chafed at being cooped up in his antiseptic room. He even fled the grounds several times, in violation of the rules, wandering down to the 59th Street Bridge and ordering a hot open-faced turkey sandwich at a nearby diner. Then one day he stumbled upon the recreation center, which can be reached from the hospital’s 15th floor, and it became his nesting ground.

It is something of a cancer patient’s corner bar, minus the booze. Mr. Gugliotta hung around and talked cancer, talked life. He sampled just about everything the center offered. Pottery, copper enameling, blackjack. He made a toolbox, a stained-glass thermometer. His wife, Francine, said, “I never thought I’d see him doing decoupage, but sure enough.”

Now, Mr. Gugliotta, 46, is a commuter, reporting every three weeks for chemotherapy. While the chemicals are mixed, a process that can make patients wait up to two hours, he repairs to the recreation center and begins methodically rocketing balls into pockets. He knows the good cue is stashed in the back. “It’s enjoyable here,” he said. “And it’s where you can talk about what’s inside you, because it’s inside everyone here.”

Nothing a

[Via http://roniyon.wordpress.com]

Pricing Digital Goods - (Hint: Not Free)

The problem with digital goods is it is easy to get confused by its economics, the marginal cost is $0, selling a unit to customer does not make it unavailable to another and there are challenges in restricting use. This has led to supposedly new branch of economics, “economics of free and abundance”, led by Mr. Chris Anderson and has built a large following.

I have written several articles on the need to sell the value and not focus on the marginal cost. In the digital world matching price to value is more difficult than it is in physical world.  Economist Brad DeLong from UC Berkeley (my alma mater) writes in his 1999 paper titled, Speculative Microeconomics for Tomorrow’s economy,

In many information-based sectors of the next economy, the purchase of a good will no longer be transparent. The invisible hand theory assumes that purchasers know what they want and what they are buying so that they can effectively take advantage of competition and comparison-shop. If purchasers need first to figure out what they want and what they are buying, there is no good reason to assume that their willingness to pay corresponds to its true value to them.

When customers do not exactly know what they want and the value they get, the marketer will find it hard to make a value proposition and charge a price that captures that value. Difficult does not make it a good reason to give up on charging for digital goods and give it away for free.

In a Nov 1998 article in Harvard Business Review, economists Hal Varian  (also from Berkeley now at Google) and Carl Shapiro wrote (Harvard Business Review, 00178012, Nov/Dec98, Vol. 76, Issue 6)

But there is a practical way to set different prices for basically the same information without incurring high costs or offending customers. You do it by offering the information in different versions designed to appeal to different types of customers. With this strategy, which we call versioning, customers in effect segment themselves. The version they choose reveals the value they place on the information and the price they’re willing to pay for it.

It takes us back to what Ted Levitt said about customers buying holes and later what Clayton Christensen said about, “what job is your customer hiring your product for?”. The difficulty in value calculation comes from focusing on the “drill” and not on the “hole”. If marketers focus on what the customers really want and what job they are hiring the digital information for it becomes easier to tease out the value to customers and how it differs across segments. Then the marketer can target the segments with specific versions and position it appropriately to capture a share of the the value through effective pricing.

Fads like freemium, freeconomics and economics of abundance can help to sell books or speaking engagements but as Hal Varian (who was descibed by Mr. Chris Anderson as someone who taught him more about economics than any of his professors) said in 1998 (full ten years before the fads):

Success in selling digital goods does not require a whole new way of thinking about business. Rather, it requires the same kind of smart managing and smart marketing that have always set apart the best companies. The real power of versioning is that it enables you to apply tried-and-true product-management techniques-segmentation, differentiation, positioning-in a way that takes into account both the unusual economics of information production and the endless malleability of digital data.

Probably Mr. Anderson missed this class.

The road to profitability in any market goes through STP! That’s Segmentation – Targeting – Positioning. The rule does not change whether you are selling physical or digital goods.

[Via http://iterativepath.wordpress.com]